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WRONGFUL BIRTH: THE AVOIDANCE OF CONSEQUENCES
DOCTRINE IN MITIGATION OF DAMAGES
INTRODUCTION
With the increasing use of voluntary sterilization as a means of birth
control,' the recently recognized wrongful birth suit2 will become more
prevalent.3 These suits arise when a normal, healthy child is born,' usu-
ally after one of the parents has undergone either a tubal ligation or va-
sectomy.' The typical and most successful cause of action in wrongful
1. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 9, 1984, at 29, col. 1. The National Center for Health
Statistics reported that in 1982 18% of couples with one partner of child bearing age used
sterilization to avoid conception, 16% used birth control pills, 7% used condoms, 5%
used diaphragms, and 4% used intrauterine devices. Id. This is a change from 1965,
when the pill, condom, rhythm, and diaphragm were the leading methods. Id. at col. 2.
Among couples who wanted no more children, as opposed to just wanting to delay child
rearing, the use of sterilization tripled between 1965 and 1982, from 18% to 62%. Id. at
col. 4.
2. See W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on the
Law of Torts § 55, at 370 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter cited as Prosser and Keeton]; Note,
Wrongful Birth. A Child of Tort Comes of Age, 50 U. Cin. L. Rev. 65, 65-66 (1981)
[hereinafter cited as Wrongful Birth]. There has been some difference of opinion among
courts and commentators as to the proper name for this type of suit. Some have pre-
ferred "wrongful conception" or "wrongful pregnancy," based on a belief that the actual
wrongdoing attributable to the defendant is the conception or pregnancy itselL and not
the resulting birth. See White v. United States, 510 F. Supp. 146, 149 (D. Kan. 1981)
(quoting Coleman v. Garrison, 327 A.2d 757, 761 (Del. Super. CL 1974), aff'd, 349 A.2d
8 (Del. 1975)); Miller v. Duhart, 637 S.W.2d 183, 188 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); O'Toole v.
Greenberg, No. 59, slip op. at 3 (N.Y. Mar. 26, 1985); Kashi, The Case of the Unwanted
Blessing: Wrongful Life, 31 U. Miami L. Rev. 1409, 1409-10 (1977); Note, Wrongful
Conception" Who Pays for Bringing Up Baby?, 47 Fordham L. Rev. 418, 418 n.7 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as Wrongful Conception]. Because the suits discussed in this Note in-
clude cases in which the pregnancy was not diagnosed or incorrectly aborted, "wrongful
conception" and "wrongful pregnancy" are too limiting for purposes of this Note. Thus,
the phrase "wrongful birth" will be used throughout.
3. See Prosser and Keeton, supra note 2, § 55, at 371-72; Wrongful Birth, supra note
2, at 65; Annot., 83 A.L.R.3d 15, 20 (1978). See infra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.
4. See University of Ariz. Health Sciences Center v. Superior Court, 136 Ariz. 579,
581 n.1, 667 P.2d 1294, 1296 n.1 (1983) (en banc); Bushman v. Burns Clinic Medical
Center, 83 Mich. App. 453, 459-60, 268 N.W.2d 683, 685-86 (1978); Weintraub v.
Brown, 98 A.D.2d 339, 342, 470 N.Y.S.2d 634, 637 (1983). A wrongful birth suit differs
from the "wrongful life' suit, which is brought as a result of some injury to the child
caused by the physician's negligence in diagnosing the pregnancy or failing to inform the
parents that the child might be deformed so that the fetus could be safely aborted. Pros-
ser and Keeton, supra note 2, at 370; see Kashi, supra note 2, at 1426-29; see, eg., Robak
v. United States, 658 F.2d 471, 473 (7th Cir. 1981) (failure to inform); Berman v. Allan,
80 NJ. 421, 424, 404 A.2d 8, 10 (1979) (same), overruled, Procanik v. Cillo, 97 NJ. 339,
478 A.2d 755 (1984); Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 NJ. 22, 24, 227 A.2d 689, 690 (1967)
(same); Comras v. Lewin, 183 NJ. Super. 42, 44, 443 A.2d 229, 229-30 (1982) (failure to
diagnose pregnancy); Park v. Chessin, 60 A.D.2d 80, 83, 400 N.Y.S.2d 110, 111 (1977)
(failure to inform).
5. See, e.g., Hartke v. McKelway, 707 F.2d 1544, 1547 (D.C. Cir.) (tubal ligation),
cert denied, 104 S. Ct. 425 (1983); McNeal v. United States, 689 F.2d 1200, 1200-01 (4th
Cir. 1982) (same); Boone v. Mullendore, 416 So. 2d 718, 719 (Ala. 1982) (same); Flowers
v. District of Columbia, 478 A.2d 1073, 1074 (D.C. 1984) (same); Cockrum v. Baumgart-
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birth suits has been based on the negligence of the physician in incor-
rectly performing the procedure.6
This Note addresses the damages awarded in these wrongful birth
suits, focusing on one method of mitigating damages: the avoidance of
consequences doctrine.7 The Note first discusses the scope of damages
ner, 95 Ill. 2d 193, 195, 447 N.E.2d 385, 386 (vasectomy), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 149
(1983); Schork v. Huber, 648 S.W.2d 861, 862 (Ky. 1983) (tubal ligation); Bushman v.
Burns Clinic Medical Center, 83 Mich. App. 453, 457, 268 N.W.2d 683, 685 (1978) (va-
sectomy); Kingsbury v. Smith, 127 N.H. 237, 240, 442 A.2d 1003, 1004 (1982) (tubal
ligation); P. v. Portadin, 179 N.J. Super. 465, 468, 432 A.2d 556, 557 (1981) (same);
Rivera v. State, 94 Misc. 2d 157, 158, 404 N.Y.S.2d 950, 951 (Ct. Cl. 1978) (same);
Stribling v. deQuevedo, 288 Pa. Super. 436, 438, 432 A.2d 239, 240 (1980) (same); Hick-
man v. Myers, 632 S.W.2d 869, 869 (Tex. Civ. App. 1982) (same); McKernan v.
Aasheim, 102 Wash. 2d 411, -, 687 P.2d 850, 851 (1984) (same); Ball v. Mudge, 64
Wash. 2d 247, 247, 391 P. 2d 201, 202 (1964) (vasectomy).
Other situations that have resulted in suits for wrongful birth have included negligence
in performing an abortion, resulting in the birth of the child, see Stills v. Gratton, 55 Cal.
App. 3d 698, 701, 127 Cal. Rptr. 652, 653-54 (1976); Wilczynski v. Goodman, 73 Il.
App. 3d 51, 52, 391 N.E.2d 479, 480 (1979); Nanke v. Napier, 346 N.W.2d 520, 521
(Iowa 1984); Jean-Charles v. Planned Parenthood Ass'n of the Mohawk Valley, Inc., 99
A.D.2d 542, 542, 471 N.Y.S.2d 622, 623 (1984); Delaney v. Krafte, 98 A.D.2d 128, 129,
470 N.Y.S.2d 936, 937 (1984), failure to diagnose the pregnancy so that an abortion
could be performed at an early enough stage of the pregnancy to assure the mother's
safety, see Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 95 Il. 2d 193, 195-96, 447 N.E.2d 385, 387, cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 149 (1983); Clapham v. Yanga, 102 Mich. App. 47, 50-51, 300 N.W.2d
727, 730 (1980), appeal dismissed, 412 Mich. 889, 335 N.W.2d 1 (1981); Ziemba v. Stern-
berg, 45 A.D.2d 230, 230-31, 357 N.Y.S.2d 265, 267 (1974), Rieck v. Medical Protective
Co., 64 Wis. 2d 514, 515-16, 219 N.W.2d 242, 244 (1974), substitution by the pharmacist
of the wrong medication instead of birth control pills, see Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App.
240, 244, 187 N.W.2d 511, 512-13 (1971), and the failure of a condom to prevent a preg-
nancy, see M. & Wife v. Schmid Laboratories, 178 N.J. Super. 122, 124, 428 A.2d 515,
516 (1981) (per curiam).
6. See, e.g., Flowers v. District of Columbia, 478 A.2d 1073, 1074 (D.C. 1984);
Nanke v. Napier, 346 N.W.2d 520, 521 (Iowa 1984); Hickman v. Myers, 632 S.W.2d 869,
869 (Tex. Civ. App. 1982); MeKernan v. Aasheim, 102 Wash. 2d 411, -, 687 P.2d 850,
851 (1984). Often, negligence is pleaded in the alternative with breach of contract or
warranty, or with misrepresentation that the plaintiff was indeed sterile as the primary
claim, see, e.g., Bishop v. Byrne, 265 F. Supp. 460, 463 (S.D. W. Va. 1967) (breach of
warranty); Boone v. Mullendore, 416 So. 2d 718, 719 (Ala. 1982) (misrepresentation);
Coleman v. Garrison, 349 A.2d 8, 12 (Del. 1975) (misrepresentation and breach of war-
ranty); Fulton-DeKalb Hosp. Auth. v. Graves, 252 Ga. 441, 442, 314 S.E.2d 653, 654
(1984) (misrepresentation); Cox v. Stretton, 77 Misc. 2d 155, 156, 352 N.Y.S.2d 834, 837
(Sup. Ct. 1974) (breach of contract); Hays v. Hall, 477 S.W.2d 402, 403 (Tex. Civ. App.)
(misrepresentation and breach of warranty), rev'd on other grounds, 488 S.W.2d 412 (Tex.
1972). Often only breach of contract is alleged. See, e.g., Herrera v. Roessing, 533 P.2d
60, 61 (Colo. Ct. App. 1975); Rogala v. Silva, 16 Ill. App. 3d 63, 64, 305 N.E.2d 571, 572
(1973); Christensen v. Thornby, 192 Minn. 123, 125, 255 N.W. 620, 621 (1934); Green v.
Sudakin, 81 Mich. App. 545, 546, 265 N.W.2d 411, 411 (1978) (per curiam); Shaheen v.
Knight, I I Pa. D. & C.2d 41, 41 (1957).
7. See infra notes 35-44 and accompanying text. The avoidable consequences doc-
trine has normally been equated with the concept of mitigation of damages. See Baglio v.
N.Y. Central R.R., 344 Mass. 14, 18, 180 N.E.2d 798, 800 (1962) (quoting Ouilette v.
Sheerin, 297 Mass. 536, 543, 9 N.E.2d 713, 717 (1937)). Many courts and commentators
have incorrectly considered the benefits offset doctrine in the Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 920 (1979) to be another form of mitigation. See, e.g., Mason v. Western Pa.
Hosp., 286 Pa. Super. 354, 372, 428 A.2d 1366, 1375 (1981) (Brosky, J., concurring),
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awarded in these suits and the attempts by some courts to limit these
damages. It then explores the avoidance of consequences doctrine as a
means of limiting the damages and examines how courts have viewed the
reasonableness of the mitigating action as a matter of law. This Note
proposes a method for application of the avoidance of consequences doc-
trine in wrongful birth suits: The jury should determine the amount of
damages awarded by considering what would have been done by the rea-
sonably prudent person in the circumstances of the plaintiff. These cir-
cumstances would include those religious, ethical and moral beliefs that
the plaintiff establishes. This Note then examines other criticisms of the
avoidance of consequences doctrine and why the proposed application
renders them invalid.
I. SCOPE OF DAMAGES IN WRONGFUL BIRTH ACTIONS
In the earliest cases, courts did not recognize wrongful birth as a cause
of action and refused to award any damages to the plaintiffs.8 They
stated a policy rationale that the birth of a normal, healthy child was not
a compensable wrong.9 Once this tort became accepted,"0 however,
courts began to award a broad range of damages including all medical
expenses incident to the pregnancy," the mother's loss of earnings dur-
ing the pregnancy, 2 pain and suffering as a result of the pregnancy and
rev'd, 499 Pa. 484, 453 A.2d 974 (1982); Wrongful Conception, supra note 2 at 431-32.
This confusion may result from the Restatement's own formulation of the benefit offset
rule: "[T]he value of the benefit conferred is considered in mitigation of damages, to the
extent that this is equitable." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 920 (1979) (emphasis ad-
ded). Mitigation is not simply a damages offiset, but instead speaks to the duty to limit
damages as reflected in idL § 918.
8. See Christensen v. Thornby, 192 Minn. 123, 126, 255 N.W. 620, 622 (1934);
Shaheen v. Knight, 11 Pa. D. & C.2d 41, 45-46 (1957).
9. See Christensen v. Thornby, 192 Minn. 123, 126, 255 N.W. 620, 622 (1934)
(plaintiff was "blessed with the fatherhood of another child"); Shaheen v. Knight, 11 Pa.
D. & C.2d 41, 45 (1957) ("to allow damages for the normal birth of a normal child is
foreign to the universal public sentiment of the people").
10. The first case to award damages for wrongful birth was Custodio v. Bauer, 251
Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967), which recognized that the purpose of the suit
was not to pay for the unwanted child but to "replenish the family exchequer so that the
new arrival will not deprive the other members of the family of what was planned as their
just share of the family income." Id. at 324, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 477. Since that case, the
majority of jurisdictions has come to recognize wrongful birth as a compensable damage.
See Prosser and Keeton, supra note 2, § 55, at 372.
11. See, ag., White v. United States, 510 F. Supp. 146, 150 (D. Kan. 1981); Public
Health Trust v. Brown, 388 So. 2d 1084, 1085-86 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Maggard v.
McKelvey, 627 S.W.2d 44, 48 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981); Kingsbury v. Smith, 122 N.H. 237,
243, 442 A.2d 1003, 1006 (1982); Weintraub v. Brown, 98 A.D.2d 339, 349, 470
N.Y.S.2d 634, 641 (1983); Sala v. Tomlinson, 73 A.D.2d 724, 726, 422 N.Y.S.2d 506, 509
(1979); Bowman v. Davis, 48 Ohio St. 2d 41, 42, 46, 356 N.F_.2d 496, 497, 499 (1976).
12. See, e-g., Fassoulas v. Ramey, 450 So. 2d 822, 823 (Fla. 1984) (per curiam); Pub-
lic Health Trust v. Brown, 388 So. 2d 1084, 1085-86 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); P. v.
Portadin, 179 NJ. Super. 465, 472, 432 A.2d 556, 559 (1981); Beardsley v. Wierdsma,
650 P.2d 288, 292 (Wyo. 1982).
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birth,' 3 loss of consortium,'" mental anguish and emotional distress for
the parents,' 5 and the costs of raising the child until majority. 16
The damages awarded for child rearing costs have been the most con-
troversial.17 Most courts refuse to award them.' 8 Their rationales have
included: child rearing costs are too speculative and uncertain to calcu-
late; 19 these costs are too remote and not within the foreseeable risk un-
dertaken by the defendant;20 the damages would be excessive; 1 the
defendant should not have to bear the costs of rearing the child while
13. See, eg., White v. United States, 510 F. Supp. 146, 150 (D. Kan. 1981); Boone v.
Mullendore, 416 So. 2d 718, 723 (Ala. 1982); Public Health Trust v. Brown, 388 So. 2d
1084, 1085 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Bushman v. Burns Clinic Medical Center, 83
Mich. App. 453, 461, 268 N.W.2d 683, 687 (1978).
14. See, eg., Boone v. Mullendore, 416 So. 2d 718, 723 (Ala. 1982); Fassoulas v.
Ramey, 450 So. 2d 822, 823 (Fla. 1984) (per curiam); Fulton-DeKalb Hosp. Auth. v.
Graves, 252 Ga. 441, 443, 314 S.E.2d 653, 654 (1984); P. v. Portadin, 179 N.J. Super.
465, 472, 432 A.2d 556, 559 (1981); Sorkin v. Lee, 78 A.D.2d 180, 184, 434 N.Y.S.2d
300, 303 (1980); Ziemba v. Steinberg, 45 A.D.2d 230, 231, 233, 357 N.Y.S.2d 265, 267,
269 (1974).
15. See, eg., Bishop v. Byre, 265 F. Supp. 460, 463-65 (S.D. W. Va. 1967); Green v.
Sudakin, 81 Mich. App. 545, 548-49, 265 N.W.2d 411, 412-13 (1978) (per curiam);
Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 244, 262, 187 N.W.2d 511, 513, 521 (1971); Beards-
ley v. Wierdsma, 650 P.2d 288, 292 (Wyo. 1982). Some courts have refused to award this
type of damages. See, e.g., Sala v. Tomlinson, 73 A.D.2d 724, 726, 422 N.Y.S.2d 506, 509
(1979); Stribling v. deQuevedo, 288 Pa. Super. 436, 442-43, 432 A.2d 239, 242-43 (1980).
16. See, e.g., University of Ariz. Health Sciences Center v. Superior Court, 136 Ariz.
579, 584-86, 667 P.2d 1294, 1299-1301 (1983) (en banc); Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal.
App. 2d 303, 324-25, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463, 477 (1967); Ochs v. Borrelli, 187 Conn. 253, 258,
445 A.2d 883, 885 (1982); Anonymous v. Hospital, 33 Conn. Supp. 125, 128-29, 366
A.2d 204, 206 (1976); Jones v. Malinowski, 299 Md. 257, 270, 473 A.2d 429, 435 (1984);
Clapham v. Yanga, 102 Mich. App. 47, 58, 61, 300 N.W.2d 727, 732, 735 (1980), appeal
dismissed, 412 Mich. 889, 335 N.W.2d 1 (1982); Green v. Sudakin, 81 Mich. App. 545,
547-48, 265 N.W.2d 411, 412 (1978) (per curiam); Betancourt v. Gaylor, 136 N.J. Super.
69, 76-77, 344 A.2d 336, 340 (1975); Cox v. Stretton, 77 Misc. 2d 155, 160-61, 352
N.Y.S.2d 834, 841-42 (Sup. Ct. 1974); Bowman v. Davis, 48 Ohio St. 2d 41, 42-46, 356
N.E.2d 496, 497-99 (1976) (per curiam); Stribling v. deQuevedo, 288 Pa. Super. 436, 441,
432 A.2d 239, 242 (1980).
17. Prosser and Keeton, supra note 2, § 55, at 372; see Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 95
Ill. 2d 193, 196-97, 447 N.E.2d 385, 387, cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 149 (1983); Comment,
Damages for the Wrongful Birth of Healthy Babies, 21 Duq. L. Rev. 605, 607 (1983)
[hereinafter cited as Damages for Wrongful Birth].
18. Cockrum v. Baumgarter, 95 Il. 2d 193, 197, 447 N.E.2d 385, 387, cert denied,
104 S. Ct. 149 (1983); Prosser and Keeton, supra note 2, § 55, at 372.
19. See, e.g., Boone v. Mullendore, 416 So. 2d 718, 721 (Ala. 1982); Coleman v. Gar-
rison, 327 A.2d 757, 761 (Del. Super. Ct. 1974), afl'd, 349 A.2d 8 (Del. 1975); Schork v.
Huber, 648 S.W.2d 861, 862 (Ky. 1983); Sorkin v. Lee, 78 A.D.2d 180, 181, 434
N.Y.S.2d 300, 301 (1980); Sala v. Tomlinson, 73 A.D.2d 724, 726, 422 N.Y.S.2d 506, 509
(1979); Beardsley v. Wierdsma, 650 P.2d 288, 292 (Wyo. 1982).
20. See, e.g., Schork v. Huber, 648 S.W.2d 861, 862 (Ky. 1983); Hickman v. Myers,
632 S.W.2d 869, 871-72 (Tex. Civ. App. 1982); Beardley v. Wierdsma, 650 P.2d 288, 292
(Wyo. 1982).
21. See, eg., White v. United States, 510 F. Supp. 146, 149 (D. Kan. 1981); Boone v.
Mullendore, 416 So. 2d 718, 721-22 (Ala. 1982) (quoting Rieck v. Medical Protective
Co., 64 Wis. 2d 514, 518, 219 N.W.2d 242, 244-45 (1974)); Sorkin v. Lee, 78 A.D.2d 180,




someone else enjoys the benefits associated with child rearing;' and the
child will feel like an "emotional bastard" when he learns that his finan-
cial support is not being provided by his parents.23
Some courts award child rearing costs24 but offset them by the antici-
pated benefits, both monetary and emotional, that the child will provide
to the parents.25 This form of mitigation is used to prevent unjust enrich-
ment to the parent who retains the benefit of having the child while col-
lecting damages from the defendant. 26 Some courts have, in calculating
the offset, examined the circumstances of the parents, basing the award
on a case-by-case standard that accounts for such factors as the number
of children already in the family, the financial resources available to the
parents and the reasons the parents sought to limit the size of the
family.27
This use of the benefits offset has been criticized on several grounds.
First, the victim of a tort should be entitled to recover all damages that
result from the wrongdoing.28 Second, the courts have failed to observe
the "same interests" limitation specified in section 920 of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts,29 which provides that the benefits used to offset
22. See, eg., McNeal v. United States, 689 F.2d 1200, 1202 (4th Cir. 1982); White v.
United States, 510 F. Supp. 146, 149-50 (D. Kan. 1981); Coleman v. Garrison, 349 A.2d
8, 12 (Del. 1975); Flowers v. District of Columbia, 478 A.2d 1073, 1075 (D.C. 1984);
Shaheen v. Knight, 11 Pa. D. & C.2d 41, 45-46 (1957); Hays v. Hall, 477 S.W.2d 402, 406
(Tex. Civ. App.), rev'd on other grounds, 488 S.W.2d 412 (Tex. 1972); Rieck v. Medical
Protective Co., 64 Wis. 2d 514, 518, 219 N.W.2d 242, 244-45 (1974).
23. See, e.g., Boone v. Mullendore, 416 So. 2d 718, 722-23 (Ala. 1982); McKernan v.
Aasheim, 102 Wash. 2d 411, _, 687 P.2d 850, 856 (1984) (en bane) (quoting Wilbur v.
Kerr, 275 Ark. 239, 243-44, 628 S.W.2d 568, 571 (1982)).
24. See, e.g., University of Ariz. Health Sciences Center v. Superior Court, 136 Ariz.
579, 584-86, 667 P.2d 1294, 1299-1301 (1983) (en bane); Ochs v. Borrelli, 187 Conn. 253,
259, 445 A.2d 883, 886 (1982); Anonymous v. Hospital, 33 Conn. Supp. 125, 128-29, 366
A.2d 204, 206 (1976); Jones v. Malinowski, 299 Md. 257, 270, 473 A.2d 429, 435 (1984);
Green v. Sudakin, 81 Mich. App. 545, 547-48, 265 N.W.2d 411, 412 (1978) (per curiam).
25. The benefits offset rule is prescribed under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 920
(1979):
When the defendant's tortious conduct has caused harm to the plaintiff or to his
property and in so doing has conferred a special benefit to the interest of the
plaintiff that was harmed, the value of the benefit conferred is considered in
mitigation of damages, to the extent that this is equitable.
Id.
26. See Mason v. Western Pa. Hosp., 286 Pa. Super. 354, 363, 428 A.2d 1366, 1370
(1981), vacated on other grounds, 499 Pa. 484, 453 A.2d 974 (1982); Note, Judicial Limi-
tations on Damages Recoverable for the Wrongful Birth of a Healthy Infant, 68 Va. L
Rev. 1311, 1323 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Judicial Limitations].
27. See Hartke v. McKelway, 707 F.2d 1544, 1553-55 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S.
Ct. 425 (1983); Jones v. Malinowski, 299 Md. 257, 272, 473 A.2d 429, 436-37 (1984);
Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 256, 187 N.W.2d 511, 518 (1971); Sorkin v. Lee, 78
A.D.2d 180, 188, 434 N.Y.S.2d 300, 305 (1980) (Hancock, Jr., J., dissenting).
28. See Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 325, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463, 477 (1967);
Cockrum v. Baumgartaer, 99 Ill. App. 3d 271, 272-73, 425 N.E.2d 968, 969-70 (1981),
rev'd, 95 IlM. 2d 193, 447 N.E.2d 385, cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 149 (1983); Damages for
Wrongful Birth, supra note 17, at 621.
29. See University of Ariz. Health Sciences Center v. Superior Court, 136 Ariz. 579,
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should be of the same type as the damages being awarded.30 Using this
principle, costs of child rearing would be offset by the expected financial
benefits of having the child, and emotional distress damages would be
offset by the emotional joys of child rearing.3
Many courts have utilized the benefits offset to hold that no cause of
action exists for recovery of child rearing costs. 3 2 Some state that the
intangible and incalculable benefits of a normal, healthy child are always
greater than the costs of rearing the child.33 Others believe that if child
rearing costs were awarded and the benefits offset applied, parents, in
order to maximize their recovery, would be put in the unsavory position
of having to declare that they do not love or want the child, or that the
child is of little value to them.34
II. USE OF THE AVOIDANCE OF CONSEQUENCES DOCTRINE
A. General Application of the Doctrine
The avoidance of consequences doctrine, as set forth in section 918 of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts,35 specifies that a plaintiff cannot re-
cover for damages that could have been avoided by the use of reasonable
effort after commission of the tort. 6 This section applies the same stan-
588-89, 667 P.2d 1294, 1303-04 (1983) (en banc) (Gordon, Vice C. J., dissenting); Flow-
ers v. District of Columbia, 478 A.2d 1073, 1080 (D.C. 1984) (Ferren, J., dissenting);
Fulton-DeKalb Hosp. Auth. v. Graves, 252 Ga. 441, 444, 314 S.E.2d 653, 655 (1984);
Damages for Wrongful Birth, supra note 17, at 621; Judicial Limitations, supra note 26, at
1323-26; Note, Wrongful Birth Damages: Mandate and Mishandling by Judicial Fiat, 13
Val. U.L. Rev. 127, 162 (1978).
30. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 920 comment b (1979).
31. See Damages for Wrongful Birth, supra note 17, at 621-22.
32. See, e.g., Coleman v. Garrison, 327 A.2d 757, 760-61 (Del. Super. Ct. 1974), a/ftd,
349 A.2d 8 (Del. 1975); Public Health Trust v. Brown, 388 So. 2d 1084, 1085-86 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Nanke v. Napier, 346 N.W.2d 520, 523 (Iowa 1984); Shaheen v.
Knight, I1 Pa. D. & C.2d 41, 45-46 (1957); Beardsley v. Wierdsma, 650 P.2d 288, 292
(Wyo. 1982).
33. See Coleman v. Garrison, 327 A.2d 757, 760-61 (Del. Super. Ct. 1974), aff'd, 349
A.2d 8 (Del. 1975); Flowers v. District of Columbia, 478 A.2d 1073, 1075 (D.C. 1984);
Public Health Trust v. Brown, 388 So. 2d 1084, 1085-86 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980);
Fulton-DeKalb Hosp. Auth. v. Graves, 252 Ga. 441, 444, 314 S.E.2d 653, 655-56 (1984);
O'Toole v. Greenberg, No. 59, slip op. at 6 (N.Y. Mar. 26, 1985); Mason v. Western Pa.
Hosp., 499 Pa. 484, 487, 453 A.2d 974, 976 (1982); Terrell v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d 124,
128 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 927 (1974); Ball v. Mudge, 64 Wash. 2d
247, 250, 391 P.2d 201, 204 (1964); Beardsley v. Wierdsma, 650 P.2d 288, 293 (Wyo.
1982).
34. See Boone v. Mullendore, 416 So. 2d 718, 723 (Ala. 1982); Flowers v. District of
Columbia, 478 A.2d 1073, 1076 (D.C. 1984); Nanke v. Napier, 346 N.W.2d 520, 523
(Iowa 1984) (quoting Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 95 Il. 2d 193, 202, 447 N.E.2d 385, 390,
cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 149 (1983)); Weintraub v. Brown, 98 A.D.2d 339, 348-49, 470
N.Y.S.2d 634, 641 (1983).
35. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 918 (1979).
36. Id. A similar doctrine can be found in Restatement (Second) of Contracts §350
(1981). However, plaintiffs using a contract theory alone as the basis of a cause of action
in wrongful birth have generally been unsuccessful. See supra note 6. But see Green v.
Sudakin, 81 Mich. App. 545, 547-49, 265 N.W.2d 411, 412-13 (1978) (damages awarded
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dard of conduct to the plaintiff as is used in determining whether a per-
son is negligent: what a reasonably prudent person under the
circumstances would do to avoid damages.37 It should be noted and em-
phasized that the plaintiff is not required to take any action to mitigate
damages. 38 The plaintiff cannot recover, however, for any increase in the
damages that results from failure to make that reasonable effort. 39 He
can recover the costs of any mitigation efforts in addition to damages for
the original injury up to the point when further injury could have been
avoided by mitigation." The burden of proof is placed on the defendant,
who must show by a preponderance of evidence that a reasonably pru-
dent person in the plaintiff's circumstances would have made the effort to
avoid the consequences.4" The burden on the plaintiff is to provide rebut-
tal evidence indicating that such an effort would not be reasonable.42
A common application of the doctrine is in personal injury cases.' 3
The plaintiff must submit to reasonable medical treatment in order to
avoid increased or permanent injury. Factors that are considered in de-
for breach of contract). The discussion in this Note is limited to the application of the
doctrine in tort law.
37. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 918 comment c (1979). This comment refers the
reader back to §§286-309 of the Restatement for further clarification of the plaintiff's
duty as a reasonably prudent person. See also Prosser and Keeton, supra note 2, §32, at
173-93 (defining the duty of the reasonably prudent person).
38. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 918 comment a (1979).
In the cases covered in this Section, it is not true that the injured person has a
duty to act, . . . but recovery for the harm is denied because it is in part the
result of the injured person's lack of care, and public policy requires that per-
sons should be discouraged from wasting their resources, both physical or [sic]
economic.
Id. "The doctrine is sometimes spoken of as involving a 'duty' or 'obligation' to seek a
cure. This is technically inaccurate since the failure to obtain medical care does not
create an obligation to anyone else-it merely limits the damages recoverable." Annot.,
62 A.L.R.3d 9, 13 n.5 (1975); see White v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 145 Iowa 408, 413-14,
124 N.W. 309, 311 (1910).
39. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 918 comment b (1979).
If harm results because of his careless failure to make substantial efforts or incur
expense [to avert the consequences of the tort], the damages for the harm suf-
fered are reduced to the value of the efforts he should have made or the amount
of expense he should have incurred, in addition to the harm previously caused.
Id.; see Shewry v. Heuer, 255 Iowa 147, 154-55, 121 N.W.2d 529, 533-34 (1963).
40. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 918 comment b (1979).
41. See Shewry v. Heuer, 255 Iowa 147, 154, 121 N.W.2d 529, 533 (1963); Zimmer-
man v. Ausland, 266 Or. 427, 432, 513 P.2d 1167, 1169 (1973) (en banc), D. Dobbs,
Handbook on the Law of Remedies § 3.7, at 189 (1973); C. McCormick, Handbook on
the Law of Damages §36, at 136-37 (1935). See infra note 84 and accompanying text.
42. See G. Lilly, An Introduction to the Law of Evidence § 15, at 45 (1978); C. Mc-
Cormick, Handbook on the Law of Evidence § 339, at 958 n.14 (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984)
[hereinafter cited as McCormick on Evidence].
43. See, e.g., Stark v. Shell Oil Co., 450 F.2d 994, 997 (5th Cir. 1971); Quadrino v.
S.S. Theron, 436 F.2d 959, 959-60 (2d Cir. 1970) (per curiam); Hayes v. United States,
367 F.2d 340, 341 (2d Cir. 1966); Rosenstein v. Chicago Transit Auth., 12 Ill. App. 3d
1089, 1093, 299 N.E.2d 396, 399 (1973); Smith v. Jones, 382 Mich. 176, 186-87, 169
N.W.2d 308, 310-11 (1969).
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termining whether the treatment is reasonable include the cost of the
treatment, the risks involved, the inconvenience the plaintiff would suffer
by undergoing the treatment and the likelihood of success.
44
Application of the avoidance of consequences doctrine in wrongful
birth cases would limit the damages awarded to the point at which the
reasonable plaintiff could have acted to avoid greater injury and loss-
either when the fetus could be safely aborted or when the child could be
placed for adoption-if these are actions the reasonably prudent person
in the circumstances of the plaintiff would have taken. As noted above,
the plaintiff is not required to abort the fetus or place the child for adop-
tion,45 but recovery may be limited to the point at which one of these
actions could have taken place.46 If the line is drawn at the point at
which the fetus could have been aborted, the maximum recovery would
include medical costs incident to the abortion, pain and suffering, emo-
tional distress, loss of consortium, loss of wages during the recovery pe-
riod, and the cost of a second sterilization when failure of the first is the
basis of the action. Using the point at which the child could be placed
for adoption-in other words, immediately after birth-maximum dam-
ages would include the medical expenses associated with the pregnancy,
loss of wages during the pregnancy and recovery period, pain and suffer-
ing, emotional distress associated both with the pregnancy and the adop-
tion, loss of consortium, and the costs of a second sterilization. The
difference between the two points is that the latter will involve added
medical expenses for the recovery, a longer period of time for loss of
wages and consortium, and differences in emotional distress.
B. Application of the Doctrine to Wrongful Birth Cases: Reasonable
Mitigation as a Factual Issue
Some courts in wrongful birth cases have supported the avoidance of
consequences doctrine although it was not applicable in the specific
case, 47 and others have used avoidance of consequences language in hold-
44. See Zimmerman v. Ausland, 266 Or. 427, 434, 513 P.2d 1167, 1170 (1973) (en
bane); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 918 comments d, e (1979); Annot., 62 A.L.R.3d
70, 82-85 (1975); Annot., 62 A.L.R.3d 9, 26-37 (1975).
45. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
46. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
47. See, e.g., Robak v. United States, 658 F.2d 471, 478-79 (7th Cir. 1981); Schork v.
Huber, 648 S.W.2d 861, 862 (Ky. 1983). Citing other wrongful birth cases in which the
court found that the avoidance of consequences doctrine had been applied, Robak noted:
The parents in each case knew the mother was pregnant within the first trimes-
ter of pregnancy. It was thus their decision to have the child after the effects of
the defendants' negligence was discovered. Because they freely chose not to
have an abortion, they should be responsible for the costs of a normal child.
658 F.2d at 479 n.23. The court in Schork, discussing its decision not to award child
rearing costs, stated that "in a pure legal sense the parents have failed to mitigate the
damages which they charge." 648 S.W.2d at 862. The dissent noted that it is "unreasona-
ble to require parents to submit the child in the womb to abortion, or the child in the crib
to adoption." Id. at 866 (Leibson, J., dissenting).
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ing that the failure to abort or place the child for adoption demonstrates
that the benefits of child rearing outweigh the costs.4" The few courts
actually applying the doctrine 9 have found as a matter of law that rea-
sonable mitigation includes abortion when the pregnancy is discovered in
the first trimester and the mother's health is such that an abortion is not
too risky." One reason for this approach is to take away from the jury a
48. The leading case in this category is Shaheen v. Knight, 11 Pa. D. & C.2d 41
(1957). The court noted that "[m]any people would be willing to support this child were
they given the right of custody and adoption." Id. at 46. This case was cited by a
number of other courts denying child rearing costs. See, e.g., Public Health Trust v.
Brown, 388 So. 2d 1084, 1086 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Mason v. Western Pa. Hosp.,
499 Pa. 484, 487, 453 A.2d 974, 976 (1982); Rieck v. Medical Protective Co., 64 Wis. 2d
514, 519-20, 219 N.W.2d 242, 245 (1974).
In Ball v. Mudge, 64 Wash. 2d 247, 391 P.2d 201 (1964), the same concept was
expressed:
As reasonable persons, the jury may well have concluded that appellants suf-
fered no damage in the birth of a normal, healthy child, whom they dearly love,
would not consider placing for adoption, and "would not sell for S50,000," and
that the cost incidental to such birth was far outweighed by the blessing of a
cherished child, albeit an unwanted child at the time of conception and birth.
Id. at 250, 391 P.2d at 204.
49. See, e.g., Comras v. Lewin, 183 N.J. Super. 42, 45-46, 443 A.2d 229, 230 (1982);
Sorkin v. Lee, 78 A.D.2d 180, 181, 434 N.Y.S.2d 300, 301 (1980); Ziemba v. Steinberg,
45 A.D.2d 230, 232-33, 357 N.Y.S.2d 265, 268-69 (1974).
50. In Ziemba v. Steinberg, 45 A.D.2d 230, 357 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1974), the court con-
sidered a case in which the pregnancy test administered during the first trimester failed to
diagnose the pregnancy. See id. at 230-31, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 267. The mother would have
had an abortion had she known she was pregnant. Id. at 231, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 267. In
the fifth month of the pregnancy, the test was positive. The pregnancy was caried to
term and a normal, healthy child was born. Id. at 234, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 270 (Cardamone,
J., dissenting). The court stated that it would allow an award of all provable damages.
See id. at 233, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 269. Child rearing costs would be included. Id. at 234,
357 N.Y.S.2d at 270 (Cardamone, J., dissenting). The dissent would have rejected the
claim for damages because the mother failed to avail herself of her legal alternatives-
having an abortion or placing the child for adoption. Id. In response to the dissent, the
majority proposed that a two-factor test be used to determine if the parents should have
been required to abort in order to mitigate damages. The first factor is the stage at which
the pregancy was diagnosed. If it was discovered at an early stage of the pregnancy,
when the risk of abortion to the mother's health is not too great, the mother might be
expected to abort. Id. at 233, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 269. The second factor, the health of the
particular mother, is used in considering the risks of the abortion. Id. Because in this
case the pregnancy was discovered after the first trimester, and the mother was advised
by the physician that an abortion would have been too risky, she was not required to
abort in order to mitigate. Id.
In a subsequent case, Sorkin v. Lee, 78 A.D.2d 180, 434 N.Y.S.2d 300 (1980), the court
considered a negligently performed vasectomy resulting in the birth of a normal, healthy
child. See id. at 181, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 300. The court refused to award child rearing costs
because they were too speculative, see id., 434 N.Y.S.2d at 300, and out of proportion to
the wrongdoing. See id. at 184, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 303. The court also applied the avoid-
ance of consequences doctrine and held that because the pregnancy was discovered early,
see id. at 183, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 302, and there was no showing that the medical condition
of the mother contraindicated an abortion, see id. at 181, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 301, the plain-
tiffs' award should not be increased because of the failure to mitigate. See id. at 182, 434
N.Y.S.2d at 302. The dissent criticized the majority for deciding to apply the avoidance
of consequences doctrine without letting the jury decide whether the reasons for not hav-
ing an abortion were reasonable. See id. at 186, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 305-306 (Hancock, Jr.,
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decision that might be influenced by the ethical and religious biases of the
jurors.5" In so doing, these courts run the risk of violating the plaintiff's
deeply held religious, ethical and moral beliefs that make unreasonable a
decision to abort or place a child for adoption.5 2 Most courts, however,
have rejected the avoidance of consequences doctrine, holding as a mat-
ter of law that no plaintiff should be required to abort the fetus or place
the child for adoption in order to mitigate damages.53 This, however,
subjects the defendant to damages that may be based wholly on the whim
of the plaintiff,54 rather than on actual beliefs.
The question of abortion is indeed controversial and so emotionally
charged55 that a decision to abort would be unreasonable for a woman
opposed to it. A large percentage of the general population would sup-
port a constitutional amendment to make abortions illegal.56 The posi-
J., dissenting). The majority's response was that while mitigation usually is an issue of
fact for the jury, in this type of case the jurors would be influenced by their ethical and
religious biases. See id. at 181-82, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 301. The decision on mitigation was
therefore left as a matter of law for the court. Id. While the mother in Ziemba was in
her second trimester of pregnancy, and the mother in Sorkin was in her first, an actual
first trimester cutoff for when abortion would be required was not specified in either case.
Other courts, however, have interpreted these decisions to imply the first trimester cutoff.
See Robak v. United States, 658 F.2d 471, 479 n.23 (7th Cir. 1981); Comras v. Lewin,
183 N.J. Super. 42, 45-46, 443 A.2d 229, 230 (1982).
51. See Sorkin v. Lee, 78 A.D.2d 180, 181-82, 434 N.Y.S.2d 300, 301 (1980).
52. See id. at 187, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 304 (Hancock, Jr., J., dissenting).
53. See, e.g., University of Ariz. Health Sciences Center v. Superior Court, 136 Ariz.
579, 586 n.5, 667 P.2d 1294, 1301 n.5 (1983) (en banc); Morris v. Frudenfeld, 135 Cal.
App. 3d 23, 31, 185 Cal. Rptr. 76, 80 (1982); Stills v. Gratton, 55 Cal. App. 3d 698, 709,
127 Cal. Rptr. 652, 658 (1976); Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 324, 59 Cal.
Rptr. 463, 477 (1967); Jones v. Malinowski, 299 Md. 257, 274, 473 A.2d 429, 438 (1984);
Clapham v. Yanga, 102 Mich. App. 47, 58-59, 300 N.W.2d 727, 733 (1980), appeal dis-
missed, 412 Mich. 889, 335 N.W.2d 1 (1981); Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 260,
187 N.W.2d 511, 520 (1971); Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169, 176 (Minn.
1977); Kingsbury v. Smith, 122 N.H. 237, 243, 442 A.2d 1003, 1006 (1982); Rivera v.
State, 94 Misc. 2d 157, 163, 404 N.Y.S.2d 950, 954 (Ct. Cl. 1978).
The decision as to whether an issue is a matter of fact or a matter of law is often based
on policy considerations. See F. James & G. Hazard, Civil Procedure 267 (1977). Gener-
ally, the jury's role in a civil case is to decide the issues of fact presented in a case and to
apply general legal rules to the fact situation. Id. at 230. As such, the jury will determine
what the parties did and what the circumstances were, and evaluate the facts in terms of
their legal consequences. Id. at 263. The court, however, can formulate rules of law that
effectively exclude the jury from making these evaluations. Id. at 266. Generally, the
determination of whether a defendant in a negligence case acted reasonably, according to
the community standards for what a reasonably prudent person would do, is a matter of
fact for the jury. Id. at 267. The judge can decide, however, whether specific conduct
should or should not have been engaged in as a matter of law, and thus preclude the jury
from evaluating the conduct. Id. at 266-67 (whether it is reasonable to require the driver
of a car to blow his horn could be a matter of fact for the jury, or a matter of law to be
decided by the court).
54. See Sorkin v. Lee, 78 A.D.2d 180, 184, 434 N.Y.S.2d 300, 303 (1980).
55. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 116 (1973); see Gest, Abortion in America, U.S. News
& World Rep., Jan. 24, 1983, at 47, col. 1; Beck, America's Abortion Dilemma, News-
week, Jan. 14, 1985, at 20, col. 1.
56. N.Y. Times, Oct. 14, 1984, at E3, col. 1. During the 1984 presidential campaign,
the conflict on the abortion issue became a prominent issue. Id. In a poll conducted by
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tion of the Catholic church is that abortion is equivalent to murder 7
Thus, it is difficult to conclude that the reasonably prudent person would
always choose to abort an unplanned pregnancy. Many women today
are having abortions, 8 however, and may have no religious, moral or
ethical opposition to the procedure. Whether a particular plaintiff has
such beliefs, and whether these beliefs are sincere, should be a matter for
the jury to decide. It cannot be assumed as a matter of law that all plain-
tiffs oppose abortion.
Placing the child for adoption presents a different issue. Religious and
political organizations that oppose abortion support adoption as an alter-
native for the pregnant woman who does not want to raise her child.5 9
There are no religions or moral prohibitions against adoption. Congress
has expressed its support of adoption in the Adoption Assistance and
Child Welfare Act of 19 80 .60 There are many people seeking to adopt
children;61 over 8000 of them adopt children from foreign countries each
year.62 There may be over 100,000 adoptions occurring each year across
the country. Yet placing a child for adoption is an extremely difficult
decision for parents when the mother has carried a pregnancy, even an
the New York Timesand CBS News during the week of September 30 to October 4,
1984, 43% of the respondents indicated that they would favor a constitutional amend-
ment that would allow abortions only to save the life of a mother. Id. Another public
opinion poll conducted by the National Opinion Research Center showed no major
changes in public attitudes since 1972, in spite of the Supreme Court's landmark decision
that year recognizing the right to abortion. Id.
57. See O'Connor, Human Lives Human Rights, Catholic New York, Oct. 18, 1984,
at S2-S3.
58. See Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Statistical Abstracts of the
United States, 1982-1983, at 68 (table no. 101). In 1979, nearly 1.5 million legal abortions
were performed in the United States. Id. There were nearly 3.5 million live births that
same year. Id. at 61 (table no. 86). Thus, there were 422 abortions for every 1000 live
births, id. at 70 (table no. 104), or 297 abortions for every 1000 live births and abortions
combined, id. at 68 (table no. 101).
59. See National Right to Life News, Jan. 12, 1984, at 4, col. 1 (special supplement on
alternatives to abortion); National Right to Life News, Oct. 28, 1982, at 5-8 (special
adoption insert); O'Connor, supra note 57, at S4-S5, col. 1 (discussing adoption services
offered through the church).
60. Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94 Stat. 501 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 670-676
(1982)). This law provides for funding to states to provide financial assistance to persons
who adopt children placed out of their own homes and living in foster care. See 42
U.S.C. § 673 (1982).
61. See National Committee for Adoption, Inc., Adoption Facts Summary-1984, at
5. It is estimated that there are 2,000,000 families seeking to adopt, based upon estimates
of the number of people being treated for infertility and accounting for the overlap when
both husband and wife are receiving treatment. Id.
62. Id. at 4. Of the 8054 children adopted from outside the United States in 1984, the
majority were from Korea. Id.
63. See P. Maza, Adoption Trends: 1944-1975; Child Welfare Research Note #9
(United States Dep't of Health and Human Services, Administration for Children,
Youth and Families, August 1984). In 1971, the last year that 50 states reported data to
the National Center for Social Statistics, 159,844 adoptions were reported. Id. at 3. The
author estimated that in 1975 there were 129,000 adoptions. Id. at 4.
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unplanned one, to term.64 Because the decision is a difficult one, how-
ever, does not mean that it is so unreasonable that, as a matter of law,
plaintiffs should not be required to consider it as a mitigating action in
wrongful birth cases. Nor should adoption be considered to be always
reasonable just because it is reasonable for many people. If the jury is
allowed to hear evidence regarding the beliefs of the particular plaintiff, it
can consider the sufficiency and depth of those beliefs and determine
whether they are such that mitigating by placing the child for adoption is
not reasonable.65
One court noted that "to hold the [defendant] responsible for the cost
of future care of a healthy normal child based upon the parent's private
decision on how to accept the unplanned pregnancy is to inflict a penalty
on the defendant that is out of all proportion to his wrong."' 66 Yet it is
equally unjust to deny those parents compensation for a wrong the miti-
gation of which would be unreasonable for them. By permitting inquiry
into the decision during the trial, rather than declaring abortion and
adoption placement reasonable or unreasonable as a matter of law, the
court allows the jury to determine the sincerity of the parents' beliefs and
to decide whether a decision to place the child for adoption would be
reasonable under the plaintiffs' circumstances.67
64. See Wilbur v. Kerr, 275 Ark. 239, 245, 628 S.W.2d 568, 572 (1982) (Dudley, J.,
dissenting); Stills v. Gratton, 55 Cal. App. 3d 699, 709, 127 Cal. Rptr. 652, 658 (1976)
(quoting Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 260, 187 N.W.2d 511, 519 (1971)); Berek,
Helping a Patient Surrender Her Child for Adoption, 22 Contemp. OB/GYN 29 (1983);
Campbell, The Birthparent's Right to Know, 37 Pub. Welfare 22, 24 (1979); Deykin,
Campbell & Patti, The Post Adoption Experience of Surrendering Parents, 54 Am. J. Or-
thopsychiatry 271, 272 (1984). The trauma of this decision extends well into the years
after the adoption, as the natural parents continue to experience mourning, a feeling of
loss, depression, and future searching for the surrendered child. Deykin, Campbell &
Patti, supra, at 271-73.
65. See infra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
66. Sorkin v. Lee, 78 A.D.2d 180, 184, 434 N.Y.S.2d 300, 303 (1980).
67. This method also avoids arbitrary criteria for determining when the mother's
health might override the need to mitigate. Those courts that require abortion as a miti-
gating action as a matter of law have developed criteria for determining when the health
risks to the mother override the duty to mitigate. See supra note 50 and accompanying
text. One criterion was that in order for abortion to be considered to be a reasonable
mitigating action, the pregnancy had to be discovered at an early stage, when the risks
from the abortion are minimal. See Ziemba v. Sternberg, 45 A.D.2d 230, 233, 357
N.Y.S.2d 265, 269 (1974). This presents the problem that while the woman who avoids
the pregnancy test until a later stage, when the health risks are greater, will recover child
rearing costs, the woman who makes an effort to detect the pregnancy at an early stage
will not be able to do so. Further, the chance of fraudulent claims exists, in that a woman
whose pregnancy was diagnosed in the first trimester could go to a different physician for
a test in the second trimester and claim that the pregnancy was not discovered until then.
A second criterion is that the woman need not abort if her health contraindicates that
procedure. Sorkin v. Lee, 78 A.D.2d 180, 181, 434 N.Y.S.2d 300, 301 (1980); Ziemba, 45
A.D.2d at 233, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 269. This, however, allows the unhealthy woman to
recover child rearing costs while the healthy woman will not be able to do so.
These problems become irrelevant when considering the alternative of placing the child
for adoption as the point of mitigation. The ability to make this decision is not based on
the health of the parent. Nor is it based on the stage at which the pregnancy is detected,
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C. The Jury's Determination of Reasonableness
A better approach, and the one intended in the Restatement (Second)
of Torts, is to leave the issue of mitigation to the jury. 8 The test is
whether a reasonable person in the plaintiff's circumstances would have
either had an abortion upon discovery of the pregnancy or placed the
child for adoption upon its birth.69 The jury would consider several cir-
cumstances: the religious, moral and ethical beliefs of the parents, 70 the
point at which the pregnancy was discovered,7' the health of the
mother,72 the parents' prior history of abortion or adoption placement, 3
the reasons the parents sought to prevent the pregnancy in the first
place,74 and the parents' reason for not wanting to place the child for
adoption."
Juries in personal injury cases have considered the health risks to the
a consideration that can lead to fraud. While there may be some strong moral or emo-
tional beliefs of the parents which contraindicate placing the child for adoption, these can
be proven by the parents and considered by the jury in determining whether adoption
placement is an appropriate mitigating action under the plaintiff's circumstances.
68. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 283 comment c (1979). The standard of the
reasonably prudent person is one that
enables the triers of fact who are to decide whether the actor's conduct is such
as to subject him to liability for negligence, to look to a community standard
rather than an individual one, and at the same time to express their judgment of
what that standard is in terms of the conduct of a human being.
Id.
69. Cf. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 283 (1979) (discussing the reasonably pru-
dent person standard). Professor Dobbs, however, believes that an objective standard
based upon the hypothetical reasonable man is too narrow a test when considering the
avoidance of consequences doctrine. The standard should be not so much the objective
standard of a reasonable man, but the subjective standard of what can reasonably be
expected of the particular plaintiff. D. Dobbs, supra note 41, at 580.
70. See infra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
71. Sorkin v. Lee, 78 A.D.2d 180, 183, 434 N.Y.S.2d 300, 302 (1980); Ziemba v.
Sternberg, 45 A.D.2d 230, 233, 357 N.Y.S.2d 265, 269 (1974).
72. Ziemba v. Steinberg, 45 A.D.2d 230, 233, 357 N.Y.S.2d 265, 269 (1974). See
infra note 76 and accompanying text.
73. This evidence would address both the sincerity and the veracity of the plaintiff's
assertion about her beliefs. Other courts, however, have not given this much weight
when considering the issue of mitigation. Compare Delaney v. Krafte, 98 A.D.2d 128,
129, 470 N.Y.S.2d 936, 937 (1984) with Stills v. Gratton, 55 Cal. App. 3d 698, 709, 127
Cal. Rptr. 652, 658 (1976). In Delaney, the New York court applied the test from
Ziemba and Sorkin, see supra note 50, and held that a woman whose first trimester abor-
tion had failed was not required to mitigate by having another abortion when she did not
discover she was still pregnant until the second trimester. See 98 A.D.2d at 129, 470
N.Y.S.2d at 937. The prior abortion was not a factor in the court's decision on her duty
to mitigate; the overriding concern being the health risk of the abortion. See id. In Stills,
the same fact pattern was present, but the court based its decision not to require mitiga-
tion on its assertion that mitigation by abortion was unreasonable as a matter of law. See
Stills, 55 Cal App. 3d at 709, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 658.
74. See Hartke v. McKelway, 707 F.2d 1544, 1553-55 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S.
Ct. 425 (1983); Jones v. Malinowski, 299 Md. 257, 270-71, 473 A.2d 429, 436 (1984);
Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 256, 187 N.W.2d 511, 518 (1971); Christensen v.
Thornby, 192 Minn. 123, 125, 255 N.W. 620, 621 (1934).
75. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
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plaintiff that might arise from the mitigating action,76 but consideration
of religious, ethical, moral and personal issues is less common 7 and
more difficult. Some plaintiffs in personal injury cases have asserted their
Christian Science religious beliefs to explain their failure to undergo
medical treatment, and have attempted to place the costs of the increased
injury on the defendant. 7  Some courts allow the jury to consider the
plaintiff's religious beliefs as one of the circumstances involved in deter-
mining the plaintiff's reasonableness in treating the injury.79 These
courts have recognized that plaintiffs should not be penalized for acting
within their religious beliefs, and would seem to support examination of
the religious, ethical and moral beliefs of wrongful birth plaintiffs to de-
termine whether they failed to take reasonable mitigating actions.
The approach herein proposed is not without problems. First, testi-
mony on personal beliefs is difficult to support and easily perjured. 0
Thus, the jurors must make a very difficult decision in determining the
honesty, sincerity and strength of those beliefs. 8 Second, it is difficult
76. See, e.g., Stark v. Shell Oil Co., 450 F.2d 994, 997-98 (5th Cir. 1971); McGinley v.
United States, 329 F. Supp. 62, 66 (E.D. Pa. 1971); Jones v. Eppler, 266 P.2d 451, 455-56
(Okla. 1953); Zimmerman v. Ausland, 266 Or. 427, 433-34, 513 P.2d 1167, 1170 (1973).
77. See Annot., 62 A.L.R.3d 9, 17 (1975).
78. See Christiansen v. Hollings, 44 Cal. App. 2d 332, 344, 112 P.2d 723, 729 (1941);
Lange v. Hoyt, 114 Conn. 590, 593-95, 159 A. 575, 576-77 (1932); Miller v. Hartman,
140 Kan. 298, 299, 36 P.2d 965, 965 (1934).
79. In Lange v. Hoyt, 114 Conn. 590, 159 A. 575 (1932), the court noted that
[w]hile the test of conduct on the part of a plaintiff in promoting a recovery
from injuries suffered is one of reasonable care and cannot be made to depend
upon the idiosyncracies of personal belief no matter how honestly held, courts
cannot disregard theories as to proper curative methods held by a large number
of reasonable and intelligent people. . . . [I]n determining whether the plaintiff
. . . exercised a reasonable degree of care, the jury were entitled to consider
with all the other evidence, her conduct in the light of her belief in the doctrines
of the Christian Science Church and the extent to which she acted in accord-
ance with them.
Id. at 596-97, 159 A. at 577-78. In Christiansen v. Hollings, 44 Cal. App. 2d 332, 112
P.2d 723 (1941), the court also allowed consideration of the religious beliefs.
[W]here the injuries are not of such a nature [where the reasonably prudent
person would necessarily seek medical care], as in the present case, thejury may
properly consider the religious beliefs of the injured person in ascertaining
whether he exercised reasonable care. Certainly, the courts should not disre-
gard the beliefs held by a large number of reasonable and intelligent people in
passing on the efficacy of the curative means adopted by the injured person.
Id. at 346, 112 P.2d at 730. The court in Miller v. Hartman, 140 Kan. 298, 36 P.2d 965
(1934), without a rationale for its decision, refused to consider the Christian Science be-
liefs of the plaintiff, and held that "[o]ne cannot enhance his damages by failing to take
reasonably appropriate action, readily available, to mitigate the damages." Id. at 300, 36
P.2d at 966.
80. Cf Prosser and Keeton, supra note 2, § 54, at 361 (discussing emotional distress
damages). Testimony on personal beliefs is similar to testimony on emotional distress
damages, in that both require the person to declare what is in his own mind. Prosser and
Keeton note that one of the reasons courts have limited and denied damages for emo-
tional distress is the danger that the testimony will be falsified or impaired. See id.
81. See Sorkin v. Lee, 78 A.D.2d 180, 181-82, 434 N.Y.S.2d 300, 301 (1980).
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for the defendant to rebut testimony about personal beliefs.8 2
D. Shifting the Burden of Proof on Plaintiffis Beliefs
One way to avoid these problems would be to shift the burden of proof
from the defendant to the plaintiff.8 3 Currently, the defendant must
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff failed to miti-
gate. 4 Thus all the plaintiff need do is present sufficient rebuttal evi-
dence to outweigh whatever evidence the defendant can introduce.8 5
Placing the burden of persuasion on the plaintiff regarding issues of per-
sonal belief would require the plaintiff to persuade the jury that these
beliefs are sincere and that mitigation should not be required. The jury
will have to examine the evidence and objectively determine if the plain-
tiff has actually proved that her beliefs about abortion or adoption are
such that the actions were not reasonable. Further, if a decision for the
plaintiff is clearly not based on the evidence, the court can reverse the
jury and impose judgment notwithstanding the verdict.86 Additionally,
with the shifted burden of proof, the defendant's burden of rebuttal is
more manageable."'
82. Cf. Prosser and Keeton, supra note 2, § 54, at 361 (discussing emotional distress
damages). The authors note that the primary reason for requiring that physical symp-
toms be present to recover for emotional distress damages is that it provides adequate
objective proof of the injury. See id. While a defendant can rebut objective proof, trying
to rebut a state of mind is much more difficult.
83. See McCormick on Evidence, supra note 42, § 336, at 947. The burden of proof
consists of two separate elements: the burden of production and the burden of persua-
sion. Once the party who has pleaded the existence of a fact produces evidence from
which the court could infer the fact, id. § 338, at 952-53, the party must persuade the
trier of fact (judge or jury) that the alleged fact is true. Id. § 336, at 947. At the time for
the verdict, the jury is instructed as to which party has the burden of persuasion and what
standard of proof must be met. While the person pleading the fact usually has the burden
of persuasion, the burden can be shifted to the other party. Id. § 337, at 949. Guidelines
for how the burden is allocated have not been consistent, see id., but some of the more
logical reasons include allocating the burden to a party where the fact lies particularly
within the knowledge of that party, id. § 337, at 950, or allocating it to the party who
contends that the more uncommon or least likely event has occurred, id. § 337, at 950 &
n.12. Because that party in the wrongful birth suit would be the plaintiff, the burden
should be allocated to her.
84. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. Preponderance of evidence requires a
showing that the happening of an event is more probable than not. McCormick on Evi-
dence, supra note 42, § 339, at 957. Thus, the defendant must present sufficient evidence
to convince the jury that a reasonable person in the position of the plaintiff would more
probably than not have undertaken the mitigating action.
85. See G. Lilly, supra note 40, § 15, at 45. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
86. After the jury has returned a verdict against the defendant, a motion for a judg-
ment not withstanding a verdict (judgment non obstante veredicto (n.o.v.)) can be made.
A. Jones, J. Kernochan & A. Murphy, Legal Method 61-62 (1980). The court, in grant-
ing this motion, disregards the jury's verdict because the evidence is so insulficent that
reasonable men could not conclude that the defendant is liable. Id. at 62 & n.24. If the
court finds that the plaintiff's evidence as to his or her belief about abortion and adoption
is so insufficient that a reasonable (and unbiased) jury could reach no other conclusion
than that such beliefs were not actual or sincere, the jury's verdict could be disregarded.
87. Because the plaintiff must now prove mitigation is not reasonable, the defendant
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Using this method of applying the avoidance of consequences doctrine
avoids forcing unreasonable actions on plaintiffs without overburdening
defendants with inflated damage claims. By allowing the plaintiff to
present his or her beliefs regarding abortion or adoption, without assum-
ing that these actions are either reasonable or unreasonable as a matter of
law, the plaintiff who truly opposes these actions will not be subjected to
a standard that treats plaintiffs of varying moral beliefs equally. By al-
lowing the defendant to challenge these beliefs in court, defendants will
not be subjected to excessive damage claims from plaintiffs seeking com-
pensation for personal decisions not supported by sincere opposition to
abortion or adoption as mitigation.
E. Further Criticisms of the Use of the Avoidance of Consequences
Doctrine
Several courts criticize the use of the avoidance of consequences doc-
trine in wrongful birth suits on grounds other than the religious, ethical
and moral beliefs involved. One frequent criticism is that a court should
not force parents to make the untenable choice between rearing the child
and either aborting the fetus or placing the child for adoption. 8 This
argument presumes a duty to take the mitigating action, a duty that does
not actually exist. 89 There is no obligation either to terminate the preg-
nancy through abortion or to place the child for adoption, but the recov-
ery of the plaintiffs is limited to those damages incurred up to the point
when action could have been taken.90 Thus, the parents do have a choice
when the avoidance of consequences doctrine is applied: They can termi-
nate the pregnancy, place the child for adoption, or rear the child them-
selves-possibly at their own expense.
Another criticism has been that the decision to abort the fetus or place
the child for adoption places such great stress on the parents that it is
unreasonable to force them to make this decision.9 Many courts, how-
need only provide sufficient rebuttal to equal approximately the amount of the plaintiff's
evidence. If the jury believes that the probability of the plaintiff's assertion is equally
likely to be true or false, the plaintiff will lose. G. Lilly, supra note 42, § 15, at 47.
88. See University of Ariz. Health Sciences Center v. Superior Court, 136 Ariz. 579,
586 n.5, 667 P.2d 1294, 1301 n.5 (1983) (en banc); Wilbur v. Kerr, 275 Ark. 239, 245,
628 S.W.2d 568, 572 (1982) (Dudley, J., dissenting); Morris v. Frudenfeld, 135 Cal. App.
3d 23, 31, 185 Cal. Rptr. 76, 80 (1982); Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 95 I1. 2d 193, 207, 447
N.E.2d 385, 392 (Clark, J., dissenting), cert. denied., 104 S. Ct. 149 (1983); Schork v.
Huber, 648 S.W.2d 861, 866 (Ky. 1983) (Leibson, J., dissenting); Clapham v. Yanga, 102
Mich. App. 47, 58-59, 300 N.W.2d 727, 733 (1980), appeal dismissed, 412 Mich. 889, 335
N.W.2d 186 (1982); Kingsbury v. Smith, 122 N.H. 237, 243, 442 A.2d 1003, 1006 (1982).
89. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
90. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
91. See Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 259-60, 187 N.W.2d 511, 520 (1971).
[Tihe psychological impact on [the parents] of rejecting the child and placing
him for adoption, never seeing him again, would be such that, making the best
of a bad situation, it is better to rear the child than to place him for adoption.
Id. at 259, 187 N.W.2d at 520.
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ever, award damages for emotional distress and mental anguish as part of
the wrongful birth award.92 Section 919 of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts specifies that the plaintiff is awarded costs of any reasonable miti-
gating action.93 Thus, the emotional distress associated with the abortion
or adoption decision can be considered as part of the damages.94
A third argument is that requiring such a decision interferes with con-
stitutionally guaranteed personal privacy rights to be free from govern-
ment interference in decisions relating to family planning and abortion."
However, just as the right to an abortion does not translate into an obli-
gation to have one to mitigate damages,96 but rather recognizes the
mother's right to make her decision, a plaintiff in a wrongful birth case is
not forced to accept governmental interference in a decision. The plain-
tiff, by bringing the wrongful birth suit, brings her decision before the
court and seeks compensation for it. The defendant certainly has the
right to ask the jury to examine the reasonableness of this decision."
Further, even with the application of the avoidance of consequences doc-
trine, the plaintiff maintains complete freedom to choose how to handle
the unwanted pregnancy. 98 The only limitation is that the parents will
92. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. While, traditionally, courts have been
reluctant to award emotional distress damages to parents for the wrongful death of a
minor child, D. Dobbs, supra note 41, § 8.4, at 559, recovery has been permitted based
on the loss of the child's companionship. Id. § 8.4, at 560.
93. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 919 (1979).
94. See Samuels v. Weiss, N.Y.L.J., March 8, 1985, at 12, col. 3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
March 7, 1985) (awarding damages for the emotional distress of placing the child for
adoption). This is certainly not to suggest that the award of monetary damages can erase
the anguish experienced by a parent who has decided to abort or place the child for
adoption. See supra note 64 and accompanying text. If the parents can be compensated
for the anguish of the unwanted pregnancy, however, the extension of these awards can
be made to the period after the mitigation decision.
95. Rivera v. State of New York, 94 Misc. 2d 157, 163, 404 N.Y.S.2d 950, 954 (Ct.
Cl. 1978). The constitutional right to privacy was first recognized in Griswold v. Con-
necticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965), regarding the right to be free from government inter-
ference in family planning decisions. In Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), the Supreme
Court recognized the right to be free from such interference regarding the decision to
abort during the first trimester of the pregnancy. Id. at 163.
96. Ziemba v. Steinberg, 45 A.D.2d 230, 233, 357 N.Y.S.2d 265, 269 (1974).
97. In Caesar v. Mountanos, 542 F.2d 1064 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 954
(1977), the issue of the waiver of the right to privacy when bringing suit was examined.
When a woman sued for emotional distress damages as a result of an auto accident, her
psychiatrist refused to testify, citing doctor-patient privilege. Id. at 1065-66. The psychi-
atrist contended that a California statute waiving this privilege when a patient sued for
mental distress damages was unconstitutional in light of Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965), and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Caesar, 524 F.2d at 1067. The
court held that such regulation was not unconstitutional in light of these decisions. Id. at
1068.
Although the effect of the [statute] may be to require litigants to make some
hard choices before bringing a lawsuit and may in fact discourage some legal
action,. . . [e]very person who brings a lawsuit under our system of jurispru-
dence must bear disclosure of those facts upon which his claim is based.
Id. (citations and footnotes omitted).
98. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
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not always be compensated for the decision to raise the child
themselves.99
Finally, it has been argued that using adoption as the mitigating action
is not in the child's best interests."°° The "best interests" doctrine is
often used in child custody cases to determine which parent is best suited
to care for the child.101 One commentary has noted that an important
consideration in the child's best interests is that the child not be removed
from a home where emotional ties have been formed."0 2 Placing a child
for adoption at birth, however, presents little danger of harming the new-
born's emotional ties. 103 Moreover, adoption may actually be in the
child's best interests. Placing the child with adoptive parents who truly
want the child may be better than leaving him or her with parents who
did not plan for or initially want the child, and who may later become
resentful about the child's birth."°c Children raised by adoptive parents
often fare better than those raised by parents who did not initially want
the child."0 5 It is also questionable whether a child's best interests are
being served when he knows that someone else is paying for his upbring-
ing because his parents did not plan for him. 10 6 There is thus little sup-
99. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
100. See Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 324-25, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463, 477
(1967); Clapham v. Yanga, 102 Mich. App. 47, 59-60, 300 N.W.2d 727, 733-34 (1980),
appeal dismissed, 412 Mich. 889, 335 N.W.2d 1 (1982); Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App.
240, 259, 187 N.W.2d 511, 520 (1971).
101. See McLendon v. McLendon, 455 So. 2d 863, 866 (Ala. 1984); Fitzgerald v. Fitz-
gerald, 464 A.2d 110, 112 (D.C. 1983); Creary v. Creary, 447 So. 2d 60, 60 (La. Ct. App.
1984); Villarreal v. Villarreal, 684 S.W.2d 214, 217 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984); Bills v. Bills,
296 S.E.2d 348, 349 (W. Va. 1982); H. Clark, Law of Domestic Relations in the United
States § 17.5, at 592 (1968) ("no one, not even a parent, has a 'right' to custody, and the
custody should always be determined in the way which best serves the interests of the
child").
102. J. Goldstein, A. Freud, & A. Solnit, Beyond the Best Interests of the Child 53-54
(1973).
103. See id. at 17.
104. See Baran, Pannor & Sorosky, Open Adoption, 21 Soc. Work 97, 99 (1976).
105. Two studies focused on children of mothers who had requested an abortion dur-
ing their pregnancies but were denied. In Forssman & Thuwe, One Hundred and Twenty
Children Born After Application for Therapeutic Abortion Refused, 42 Acta Psychiatrica
Scandinavica 71 (1966), the researchers found that the "unwanted" children had a less
secure family life, received more psychiatric services, and were involved in criminal and
antisocial behavior more often than children from the general population. See id. at 86-
87. In Matejcek, Dytrych & Schuller, Children from Unwanted Pregnancies, 57 Acta
Psychiatrica Scandinavica 90 (1978), the researchers found deficiencies in psychosocial
development and educational achievement among children from unwanted pregnancies.
See id. at 90; see also J. Goldstein, A. Freud & A. Solnit, supra note 102, at 20-21 (noting
that unwanted infants have a reduced chance of healthy growth and development unless
they are placed with loving parents).
106. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. In one case, the court's concern about
the impact on the child resulted in the following closing note:
Since the child involved might some day read this decision as to who is to pay
for his support and upbringing, we add that we do not understand this com-
plaint as implying any present rejection or future strain upon the parent-child
relationship. Rather we see it as an endeavor on the part of clients and counsel
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port for the proposition that as a matter of law, placing the child for
adoption is not in the child's best interests and is therefore an unreasona-
ble action for the parents.
CONCLUSION
The use of the avoidance of consequences doctrine in wrongful birth
cases has been fraught with controversy. Nevertheless, it provides a
valid mechanism for limiting damage recoveries in these cases so that the
plaintiff cannot place on the defendant a burden out of proportion to the
wrongdoing. The doctrine has been misapplied by some of the courts
that have used it, and the mitigating actions have been erroneously con-
sidered by other courts to be unreasonable as a matter of law. By apply-
ing the doctrine as intended in the Restatement (Second) of Torts and
allowing the jury to examine the circumstances of the plaintiff in deter-
mining whether or not mitigation was appropriate, the award of damages
will be fair to both plaintiffs and defendants. Damages will include all
costs up to the point at which mitigation should have occurred and,
where mitigation is unreasonable because of the beliefs of the plaintiffs,
child rearing costs. By shifting the burden of persuasion to the plaintiff,
the evidence of personal belief that is introduced will be less likely to be
perjured. A reasoned application of the doctrine of avoidance of conse-
quences will allow courts to avoid overburdening defendants without
forcing on plaintiffs untenable decisions regarding abortion or adoption.
Norman M. Block
to determine the outer limits of physician liability for failure to diagnose the
fact of pregnancy.
Rieck v. Medical Protective Co., 64 Wis. 2d 514, 520, 219 N.W.2d 242, 245-246 (1974).
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